In this evolving era of machine learning security, membership inference attacks have emerged as a potent threat to the confidentiality of sensitive data. In this attack, adversaries aim to determine whether a particular point was used during the training of a target model. This paper proposes a new method to gauge a data point’s membership in a model’s training set. Instead of correlating loss with membership, as is traditionally done, we have leveraged the fact that training examples generally exhibit higher confidence values when classified into their actual class. During training, the model is essentially being ‘fit’ to the training data and might face particular difficulties in generalization to unseen data. This asymmetry leads to the model achieving higher confidence on the training data as it exploits the specific patterns and noise present in the training data. Our proposed approach leverages the confidence values generated by the machine learning model. These confidence values provide a probabilistic measure of the model’s certainty in its predictions and can further be used to infer the membership of a given data point. Additionally, we also introduce another variant of our method that allows us to carry out this attack without knowing the ground truth(true class) of a given data point, thus offering an edge over existing label-dependent attack methods.